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BOOK REVIEW
THE PIG FARMER'S DAUGHTER AND OTHER TALES OF AMERICAN
JUSTICE: EPISODES OF RACISM AND SEXISM IN THE COURTS FROM
1865 TO THE PRESENT. By Mary Frances Berry. New York, NY:
First Vintage Books. 1999. Pp. 295. $13.00.
Reviewed by Linda Martin Pybas*
I. INTRODUCTION
Says author Berry, when a black man is lynched or executed it
is because the "powerful-most usually white males--defined him as
an object-the other-whose punishment, whether guilty or not, signs
racial subordination through perpetuation of a negative image of black
males."' Furthermore she says, when an African American woman's
rape is ignored, it is because she is socially constructed as inferior.
2
The white woman is socially constructed as "the other" when "no" is
construed to mean "yes" because "by definition," she is "available for
[the] white man's desire." 3 By the existence of these constructs, says
Berry, we can observe that "[e]veryone involved is constructed
through the angle of vision of the white man's privileged sight."
4
In The Pig Farmer's Daughter and Other Tales of American
Justice,5 Mary Frances Berry examines the underlying social subtext
of several appellate court decisions. 6 In her introduction, Berry says,
"we change the law not by focusing exclusively on formal legal rules
but by changing the experiences, and eroding [the] myths and
stereotypes that underlie each person's stories."7  Berry cites the
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, 2002.
1. MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE PIG FARMER'S DAUGHTER AND OTHER TALES OF
AMERICAN JUSTICE: EPISODES OF RACISM AND SEXISM IN THE COURTS FROM 1865 TO THE




5. Hereinafter The Pig Farmer.
6. Dr. Mary Frances Berry is the chairperson of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission. She
was the Assistant Secretary for Education in the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare during President Carter's administration. Id. at 1. She has a Ph.D. in History and a
J.D. from the University of Michigan. She is a Professor of History at the University of
Pennsylvania. <http://www.history.upenn.edu/faculty/berry.html >.
7. BERRY, supra note 1, at 19.
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demise of the civil rights protest movement as leaving the "positive
social change with respect to race" stalled.8 Moreover, writes Berry,
the American court system has long been and continues to be a white-
male-oriented institution.9 She notes that in order to effectuate change,
we all must work to undo the "internalization of the Euro-American
master's narrative."' 0  This narrative makes the white heterosexual
male's experience the norm, and relegates all other "stories"
(experiences) as deviant from that norm. 1
The Pig Farmer also aims to draw its reader's attention to
storytelling, and to "expand the repertoire of the stories" available for
the reader's use when analyzing case law. 12  She does this by
examining state appellate judicial decisions. While examining these
decisions, Berry tries to show how the "stories" believed by judges,
juries, and lawyers about non-white or non-male or non-heterosexual
human beings influence the law and how these beliefs influence the
way "justice and injustice are dispensed."'13
Berry does a spectacular job of showing the reader her view of
the justice system. All lawyers and judges should have to read Berry's
book as a prerequisite to practicing law or sitting on the bench. If
nothing else, it would make them think about their decisions and their
own experiences as they reflect upon the "stories" about which Berry
has written. Yet, in her zealous effort to put her point forward, Berry
makes some errors in reasoning.
Chief among these is a tendency to make conclusions about
fact patterns where other alternatives might exist for the judges'
decisions. Through Berry's lens, no matter which way a judge decides
he is upholding white male privilege. While one would be hard
pressed to argue with her thesis given the volume of evidence
presented here, the tendency toward circular reasoning made this
reader uneasy about making that conclusion definite. Moreover,
though Berry purports this book to be about the state of American
justice, she included very few earlier cases decided in the northern
states. Though this might not make a difference in her findings, one
cannot be sure.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 247-48, n.24.
10. Id. at 19.
11. Id. 19-20.





A. The Protection of Home and Hearth:
Sex Outside of Marriage
1. Extramarital Affairs
According to Berry, the general narratives that fuel judges'
decisions in the area of divorce and extramarital affairs included three
notions. First, judges ascribed to the notion that white women were
frail beings in need of protection.14 Second, the judges believed that as
long as men kept their affairs discreet, society would tolerate them.'
5
And third, judges noted that men have sexual urges, which must be
fulfilled; therefore, society tolerates the affairs.' 6  Says Berry, often
these stories are intersected with prevailing stories about race and
social class. 17
Berry explains the narratives she believes were at work in the
judges' decisions where race and gender clashed. Says Berry, where a
white man had sex with a black woman, this was merely "continuation
of an old practice condoned under slavery."' 18  In Turner, the lower
court may have seen sex between a white man and an African
American woman as being of little consequence. 19 However, says
Berry, the appellate court saw a powerful narrative alive at that time
and possibly today which sets forth that chaste, frail white women




17. Id. at 21-48. For example, Professor Berry retells the story of Turner v. Turner, 44
Ala. 437 (1870), an Alabama divorce case. Here, Ann discovered Matthew was having sex
with an African American who was the couple's former slave, named Sally. Despite Ann's
insistence that Sally be removed from the home, Matthew refused to remove her, and even
threatened to whip his wife for her interfering in his sex life. Sally, "supported by the
authority of her master," became insolent to Ann. Matthew forbade his wife to chastise Sally.
The high court of Alabama overturned the lower court which had denied Ann alimony or
divorce, and granted her divorce. The court established a lien on the Matthew's sizable assets
($400,000) to keep them from being removed from the state. Ann brought to the marriage
only her excellent reputation as a "'a chaste ... useful and obedient wife."' See also BERRY,
supra note 1, at 21-23.
18. BERRY, supra note 1, at 23.
19. Id. at 22-23.
20. Id. at 23. According to Berry, Matthew had deviated from the time-honored tradition
of protecting his wife and children from the knowledge of his extra-marital, cross-racial affair.
She says by humiliating his wife in the presence of his black concubine and by expecting his
2001]
MARGINS [VOL. 1:169
words, Berry believes that while it was acceptable for Turner to sleep
with Sally, it was not acceptable for Sally's status to rise above his
wife's status in his household or to make the affair public.2'
2. Family Values
In the 1800s, fornication 22 between unmarried couples of the
same race was punished differently than fornication between
unmarried couples of different races. 23 In addition, until 1967 when
the Supreme Court of the United States in Loving v. Virginia found
laws against interracial marriage unconstitutional,24 any state could
prohibit interracial relationships. 25  The court's decisions of this era
reflected a fear that "mongrels born of such marriages would
overburden the poor." 26 According to Berry, these old narratives have
not gone away and still appear in the current affairs of today.
27
wife's "submission to Sally," Matthew "had inverted well-established social and racial
norms."
21. Id. The judges might also have granted the divorce because they felt it was the
legally proper thing to do.See also discussion, infra p. 178-181.
22. "Fornication" is defined as "[slexual intercourse other than between married
persons." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 451 (6th ed., 1991).
23. BERRY, supra note 1, at 32 (citing Pace and Cox v. State, 69 Ala. 231 (1881)
(upholding the conviction of a black man and a white woman for adultery and fornication).
These defendants were sentenced to two years in prison while intraracial fornicators usually
only paid a fine. The court noted that finding otherwise might encourage interracial
fornicators and produce "a mongrel population and a degraded civilization."
24. BERRY, supra note 1, at 44 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). The
Court found that preventing interracial marriage violated the equal protection clause. Justice
Warren called distinctions drawn according to race as "outmoded." America, he said, is now a
country "whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."
25. In the early 1950s 31 states still had interracial marriage bans. By 1967, fourteen
states had repealed these laws (including Maryland). BERRY, supra note 1, at 44 (citing
Loving, 388 U.S. 1).
26. BERRY, supra note 1, at 35 (quoting Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877) ( upholding
the conviction of a black man, Green, and a white woman, Atkinson, for violating the ban
against interracial marriage. Green and Atkinson lived together while laboring at a plantation.
The couple did have a marriage license, signed by a minister and judge. By finding the
marriage against the law, the court effectively voided it. A common stereotype prevalent at
this time was that mulatto children would be intellectually and physically defective.
27. For example, in a 1965 Moynihan report on black families, it was reported that
African American inequality would not be eased until their licentiousness and sexual
irresponsibility declined and father-headed families became the rule among the black poor.
The past and current public emphasis was on black, unmarried mothers collecting welfare, and
single parenthood became the symbol of all that was wrong with America. "Family values"
became the Republican mantra. The definition of "family" left out all but the opposite-sexed,
same-raced, two-parented type with 2.5 children. BERRY, supra note 1, at 45-46 (citing Ronald
Reagan, Ronald Reagan's Call to Action (NY, Warner 1976)).
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B. The Crime That Had No Name.
Narratives of Gay and Lesbian Sex
1. Homosexuality and the Law
In this chapter, Berry examines the historical treatment of gays
and lesbians under the law. Decade by decade from 1865, she
examines the stories which have permeated American culture and the
courts. When judges examined homosexuality after the Civil War,
they referred to it as an "abominable and detestable crime. 28 One
sodomy defendant was described as "a raving, vicious, bull, running at
large upon the highways, who should be penned., 29  In the 1800s,
sodomy was outlawed by all but five of the thirty-eight states. 30 Berry
notes that race and class distinctions intersected with sexuality.
3 1




Berry writes that, in the 1930s, the Army and Navy began
using testing and induction physicals to keep homosexuals out of the
military.33 According to Berry, the Army claimed to be able to pick
out the homosexuals by their "effeminate looks and behavior."
34
During wartime, the demand for soldiers relaxed this exclusion, but
only so long as the relationships were kept private and consensual.
Thus began the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy of tolerating
gays in the military.
35
28. BERRY, supra note 1, at 49 (citing Darling v. State 47 S.W. 1005 (1898) (describing
oral sex as "vile and detestable"); Prindle v. State, 31 Tex.Crim.App. 551 (1893); Medis v.
State, 27 Tex.App. 194 (1889) (finding the defendant who complained of being sodomized as
having evidently consented to the "bestial act")).
29. Id.
30. BERRY, supra note 1, at 51.
31. Id. at 51, 56-57 & 67-68.
32. African Americans and the white poor were over represented among the small
number of persons jailed for these offenses. Id.
33. Id. at 57.
34. Yet, said a Newsweek article, "'scores of these inverts' slipped through." Id. (citing
Homosexuals in Uniform, NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1947, at 54).
35. BERRY, supra note 1, at 57 (quoting and citing Alan B&ub , Marching to a Different
Drummer: Lesbian and Gay GI's in World War 1, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING




According to Berry, in the 1940s and 1950s, the old sin and
perversion stories continued. However, courts did begin to look at
civil liberty issues absent until then. In Barton v. State, ,the Georgia
Supreme Court still denounced homosexual sodomy as "vile" and
"distasteful," but overturned a conviction because it insisted on a
"somewhat full" description of the crime.36 Decisions like Roe v.
Wade, 37 Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 and Stanley v. Georgia39 gave gays
some hope that the Court would outlaw persecution of homosexual
sex. Alas, the hope was short lived.4 °
Berry also noted that gay and lesbian parent-custody disputes
"remain caught between new and old stories.",4 1 One story considers
homosexual partners to be capable of maintaining a loving, caring,
non-perverse, or non-coercive home.42  The other story worries that
gay couples will infect their children with their "disease. 43  Yet
another story avoids the issue altogether and decides cases based on
contract or property law, rather than family law principles.
44
36. BERRY, supra note 1, at 58 (quoting Barton v. State, 53 S.E.2d 707, 708 (1949). See
also BERRY, supra note 1, at 68 (citing Franklin v. State & Joyce v. State, 257 S.2d. 21 (1971)
(overturning the conviction of a man found guilty of a "crime against nature"; the law was
held to be "void on its face as unconstitutional for vagueness and uncertainty").
37. BERRY, supra note 1, at 70 (citing 410 U.S. 113 (1975) (holding that privacy rights
included a woman's right to abort her fetus).
38. BERRY, supra note 1, at 70 (citing 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a married
person has a right to birth control).
39. BERRY, supra note 1, at 70 (citing 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that a person has a
right to view pornography in the privacy of her home).
40. BERRY, supra note !, at 70-72 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 186 (1986))
where the Court held that the federal right to privacy did not extend to homosexual sex, even
in one's own home. Rather than framing the issue as one involving privacy, the Court framed
the issue as the right to engage in homosexual sodomy. The Court used the old argument that
history and tradition had prohibited gay sex. As Berry points out, "[tihe Bowers case relied on
the old narrative of homosexuality as sin and perversion." "Twenty-five states still outlawed
sodomy in 1994."
41. BERRY, supra note I, at 72-77.
42. Id. at 75-76. Berry notes that most states are caught in between these stories, saying
that "[b]y 1995, eight states had denied custody to a homosexual parent and five had not." Id.
at 76.
43. Id. at 73-75.
44. Id. at 77 (citing Shirley Elder, No More Love Match: Navratilova Tells Her Side of
Palimony Suit, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 18, 1991. Berry writes, the "non-marital
cohabitation agreement" between Martina Navratilova and her lover, Judy Nelson, was
interpreted "so as to require no sanction of their lesbian relationship." Even though the
dispute was settled out of court, and despite public awareness that the couple were more than
just business partners, the "legal result relied solely on contract law." See also Martina Settles
'Palimony'Suit, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, March 14, 1992).
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C. Of Concubine and Mistress-Inheritance Rights of African
American and Unmarried White Mistresses
1. African American Concubines
Berry points out that African American women and their
children inherited only if the white male had provided for them in his
will. 45  Notes Berry, this outcome upset neither the status quo,
patriarchy, nor racial subordination stories because by respecting the
white male's wishes, the courts were respecting the patriarchy,4 and
registering their understanding of a white male lusting after the over-
sexed and ever-available black female.47 When the white male had no
will, the African American woman would not fare so well.48
According to Berry, because the court was not doing the bidding of the




White female mistresses fared worse than their black sisters.
Here, says Berry, "[t]he protection of racial paternalism was not an
issue, nor was white male lust for interracial sex." 50  Berry explains
the narratives told of white females cavorting with married men,
portraying the white females "as if they were prostitutes claiming
payment from the dead."5' Berry points out that here there were "[no]
racial or other legal bans [that] prohibited marriage." 52 According to
Berry, if he had no wife, the court figured that if the man had valued
his white mistress, he would have married her. 53 Either way, the white
45. BERRY, supra note 1, at 80-81.
46. Id. at 102-03. Berry may be understating the notion that some courts may simply
have felt that awarding the intent of the testator was the proper rule of law to follow.
47. Id. Berry may also be understating the possibility that a white male and a black
female could have a loving, healthy, power-balanced, long-term relationship; and that the
judges' decisions simply reflected an equitable decision given the couple's inability to marry.
48. BERRY, supra note 1, at 86-87.
49. Id. at 86-87,103 (noting that intestacy laws long ignored the rights of illegitimate
children to inherit from their biological fathers). African American mothers and their mulatto
children had to prove that their lovers (or fathers) had intended for them to inherit or that they
were common-law wives (or non-illegitimate children). They were seldom successful. Id.
50. Id. at 93.
51. Id.




mistress often lost out. Even if the man had a will, the court often
found other legal ways to invalidate it.
54
Berry opines that there is a growing acceptance in the courts to
do away with the old story of the scheming, immoral harlot and
replace it with the application of the rule of "implementing the will of
the testator." 55  Berry states that claims can no longer be overtly
invalidated on the basis of race, gender, class, or sex.
56
D. The Business of Sex- Prostitution
Berry says, "state courts [have] consistently validated the story
that prostitution was acceptable because it permitted the expression of
male desire with lower-class, immoral women and did not threaten the
hierarchies of race, gender, and class subordination. ' ' 57 For example,
Berry relates the case of a black man convicted of soliciting white
prostitutes, and discusses how abhorrent the idea of a black man
exploiting an innocent white woman is to society. 58 On the other hand,
a black man soliciting a black female prostitute is much less
abhorrent. 
59
Moreover, Berry discusses the case of Mollie's Place, a brothel
frequented by judges from Alabama and Mississippi. 6°  Here, only
white male clientele and white prostitutes were allowed, and Molly
insisted her girls not drink, smoke, or behave indecently. 6 1 The court
always found a reason to dismiss charges against Molly.62  Only
"behavior which conflicted with this story line with prevailing views
of gender roles was punished by the courts., 63 Berry notes that the
54. Id. at 94.
55. Id. at 100.
56. Id. at 103. However, she says, unsuccessful claims brought by unmarried partners
are sometimes turned down when judges find wills invalid because they were made under
fraud or duress (usually perpetrated by the immoral harlot herself).
57. Id. at 107.
58. Id. at 104-07. See, e.g., State v. Shillcutt, 350 N.W. 686 (1984).
59. BERRY, supra note 1, at 107.
60. Id. at 107-08 (citing James R. McGovern, Sporting Life on the Line: Prostitution in
Progressive Era Pensacola, FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY 54, 137-38 (1975)).
61. BERRY, supra note 1, at 107.
62. Id. at 108. For example, the police would conduct periodic raids, fining the brothels
with which the police would enrich their own treasuries, but never shutting the places down.
63. Id. at 108-09 (quoting Malta Scarborough v. State, 46 Ga. 26 (1872)). Berry notes
the case of man convicted of soliciting the prostitution of his wife and daughters. The court
did not let the man escape liability because he was seldom home because, said the court, "if
the women carried on lewdness with 'his connivance or permission' and in his presence, he
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prevailing narrative was that men could not be expected to control
their sexual urges, and without a prostitute as an outlet, he might avail
himself of the nearest respectable woman! 64 After all, even judges
frequented Mollie McCoy's.
65
Berry observes that prostitution issues were different for
African American women.66  Because black woman could not enter
many "respectable" hotels or restaurants, they were more likely to
become streetwalkers where they were exposed to local police and
thus more easily identified as prostitutes.
67
E. Promise Her Anything-The Crime of Seduction
Berry notes that actions for seduction68 had three purposes: "to
avoid private vengeance, to curb male sexual behavior, and to disgrace
or harm the violator as much as a fallen woman., 69 These actions were
primarily brought by white women suing white men.70  However,
where the woman was poorer than the man or where the woman was
African American, other narratives played out in the courts.
71
was responsible." The court announced, the "father 'is the head of the family, and can control
what is done there.' By not exercising control, he submitted to the downgraded behavior of
his wife and daughters.").
64. BERRY, supra note 1, at 109-10.
65. Id. at 108.
66. Id. at 113.
67. Id. at 113-14. Moreover, says Berry, in accord with the narrative that says that
African Americans are licentious and inferior, the white majority police took little or no notice
of cases involving African American prostitutes and their black male clients. Even where
blacks ran brothels, the police ignored them. That is until the brothel crossed racial lines.
68. "Seduction" is a criminal or civil sanction whereby the man is charged with making
certain promises to induce the woman to have sex with him. This "promise" was usually the
expectation that he would marry her. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 945 (6th ed., 1991).
69. Id. at 127.
70. Id. at 127, 131. Berry also observed that race narratives affected "white" claims in
that a white woman or man's contact with a "Negro" might be seen by the courts and juries as
evidence that the contestant was not as virtuous as he or she claimed to be. Id. at 129-30, 151.
71. Id. at 128-30 (citing Wood v. State, 48 Ga. 192 (1873) and Plans Bay State Anti-
Balm Act, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1935)). Berry notes that poorer women might be characterized
as gold-diggers who sought financial gain despite their consent to the sexual relationship.
Further she says, "judges had no problem considering African American and poor women as
already soiled," and thus unable to sustain claims against the men accused. See also BERRY,
supra note 1, at 137. A typical defense cited by the male was that he could not have seduced
the woman because she was already promiscuous. The Georgia high court found against a
"bad woman at heart" whom it felt "may be burning with lust" and, therefore, who was not a
virtuous woman for whom the law of seduction was made. Id. at 130 (quoting Wood, 48 Ga.
at 192). See also BERRY, supra note 1, at 137 (noting that in "all eight Southern states which
criminalized seduction, women had to be chaste to claim redress under the law").
2001]
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Berry notes that in the 1800s the compelling narrative
emphasized the protection of "the virtue of respectable females," the
family reputation, and a woman's continuing eligibility for marriage
("fallen" women were no longer marriage material).72 Historically, the
woman's father or husband could bring suit against the alleged seducer
for damages to his "property." 73 Berry remarks that to escape the
dishonor for herself and her family name, "a woman might accept her
seducer's agreement to marry her in exchange for dropping seduction
charges.,
74
In the 1900s, the driving narrative was that of the need for
financial support of women and their illegitimate children, who might
otherwise become dependent on the government for support. 75 In the
1930s, many states repealed their seduction statutes. 76 Reformers, says
Berry, accepted a new narrative of a woman who was empowered to
resist promises to marry and pressure to have sexual relations.
77
According to Berry, this view is more words than practice, because
courts still decide cases based on the old story of the vulnerable needy
female bending to the will of the lascivious male.78
F. The Consequences of Sex-Abortion and Child Support
1. Abortion
Berry notes the historical tale of abortion in America.
Abortion was not made criminal until 1880. 79 Furthermore, between
72. BERRY, supra note 1, at 127-28 & 135-37.
73. BERRY, supra note 1, at 136 (citing Mary Francis Berry, Judging Morality. Sexual
Behavior and Legal Consequences in the Late Nineteenth-Century South, JOURNAL OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 78 (Dec. 1991). Berry notes that the source of this "wives and daughters
as property" notion stems from the common law contract theory, which categorized wives and
daughters as servants. Losing the use of your servant, either as a sexual partner or as a home
caretaker could result in recoverable losses to the husband or father. After the Civil War, in a
few states, a woman could bring a suit on her own behalf. Id.
74. BERRY, supra note 1, at 142-43 (noting two such results: Honnett v. Honnett, 33
Ark. 156 (1878) (in which a man refused to live with his wife, denouncing her and her
character to anyone who would listen) and Jack Thornton v. State, 20 Tex. 519 (1886) (in
which a man, upon finding out he could not divorce his new wife, slit her throat on the way
home from the wedding ceremony).
75. BERRY, supra note 1, at 147-48.
76. Id. (citing Bay State Bans, supra note 71, at 11).
77. BERRY, supra note 1, at 143-44.
78. Id. at 144.
79. Id. at 154.
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1880 and 1973 when Roe v. Wade8° was decided, safe abortion was
problematic. 8 Wealthy women often had access to physicians who
were willing, for the right price, to perform abortions. Wealthy
women also may never have become pregnant because they had access
to birth control, which poorer women did not.82 Berry notes that by
1890, most women who obtained abortions were unmarried and
poor. 83 African American and poor white women often depended on
dubious methods, which often ended in injury or death.84 The general
public, juries, and judges tolerated women who had abortions because
says Berry, the story of the "disgraced female" seeking to ameliorate
an unplanned pregnancy is a powerful one.
85
Non-physician abortionists tended to be punished for
performing the procedure more often than physicians.R6 According to
Berry, this was due to the power of mostly wealthy, white male
physicians who warred against poor, female, or black midwives and
homeopaths.8 7  Berry writes, non-physicians who botched abortions,
"played the perfect villian[s] in the story that [powerful white] male
MD's told of needing to guard the scientific integrity of the medical
profession." 88 Berry also notes that as a result of this war, the legal
system stepped up its efforts to regulate the practice of abortion.
89




84. Id. at 155. However, statistics on black women's procurement of abortions at this
time are non-existent. Berry points out that this is most likely because black women were so
poor they were the least likely to have physicians performing their abortions. Thus also
making it less likely for there to be records or prosecutions of these women.
85. Id at 154-155. The judges may also have felt sympathy for the women or felt that
the law restricting a woman's right was wrong.
86. BERRY, supra note 1, at 156-57 (citing the case of "Dr." Morani, a barber, who
advertised himself as a licensed physicians and performed abortions. A court convicted
Morani of second degree murder. People v. Morani, 196 Cal. 154 (1925)).
87. BERRY, supra note i, at 156.
88. Id. at 156-157. The non-physicians may have been less careful, less likely trained, or
more likely to use dubious, dangerous methods.
89. Id. at 157-58. Police began raiding abortion clinics, collecting records, and medical
instruments. According to Berry, because of the potential invasion of the women's privacy,
this process may have undermined patients' confidence in their doctors, making them less
likely to obtain safe abortions. Berry also notes that in the 1980s and 1990s even after the
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, abortion opponents still wove a story of abortion as
sinful and murderous. Thus "[i]n the 1990s, violence began to constrain abortion rights."
Lack of access to safe clinics, refusal of many medical schools to train doctors in abortion





Berry says there have been several consistent themes in the
treatment of men and their financial relationships with their children.
First, she says when women brought out-of-wedlock pregnancies to
term instead of opting for abortion, birth control, or infanticide, claims
brought for support of these children invoked race, gender, and class
issues into the courts.90 Among these themes is the notion that until
recently "out-of-wedlock" births in the African American community
infrequently led to legal proceedings."
91
In 1935, the federal government passed the Aid to Dependent
Children (ADC) Act.92  Though eligible, few black women received
any benefits until the 1960s when the civil rights welfare movement
insisted they did.93  After this, says Berry, the white public began
"accepting the story that promiscuous, licentious black women who
became pregnant out of wedlock [were causing] the explosion of
illegitimacy and rais[ing] welfare costs."94 Says Berry, white women
whose babies were highly adoptable suffered far less social costs than
black women.
Berry notes that in the 1940s, society's concern, (or, more
specifically, white men), about the freedom of the new more
independent white women brought stricter sanctions against them for
becoming pregnant while not married.96
90. Id. at 169-71 (citing State v. Murray, 63 NC 31 (1868); Boles v. State, 10 Ala. App.
184 (1871); and Christian v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. 954 (1873)). In Christian, says Berry, a
rape conviction was reversed because the woman had two illegitimate children, which, said
the court, meant the woman "lacked 'virtuous sensibilities."' Thus, says Berry, because she
was the sort of woman who engaged in sex without marriage, often the woman's credibility as
a witness was called into question. The courts did not question the tarnished reputations of the
men who engaged in sex this way.
91. BERRY, supra note 1, at 169-70. This, says Berry, is because children born of slaves
were the property of their masters, and, unless he acknowledged the child, no white man could
be designated the father of a black woman's child.
92. This was part of the Social Security Act and was meant primary to help white
widows and their children.
93. BERRY, supra note I, at 172.
94. Id. at 172-73.
95. Id. at 173 (citing Linda Gordon, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND
THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 85, 273 (NY, 1994)).
96. BERRY, supra note I, at 173. According to Berry, the women were often deemed
unfit mothers whose children should be taken away. This negative reaction led many more
unmarried women to put their babies up for adoption. Homes for unwed mothers sprang up
around the country. Except for in large northern cities, these homes were segregated by race.
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G. Suffer the Children: Incest and Child Rape
Berry says the narrative involving child incest and child rape
had evolved from one in which the primary objective was to protect
the reputation of the rapist to one in which there is concern for the
victim and an interest in punishing the rapist.97  Berry says this is
because our society has evolved somewhat from a truly patriarchal
one.98 She notes, however, that we still have some of the old stories,
especially that of the seductive female child.99
Berry notes that in the 1960s and 1970s, there was a trend in a
few states toward decriminalizing incest and other family violence
crimes.100 By the 1980s, this trend subsided.' 0' Berry cites the
women's movement's challenge of male control as leading society and
the courts to develop new stories with regard to incest and child
rape.1°2 Appellate courts, she says, "became less receptive to defenses
based on the need to uphold male control.' 0 3  However, courts have
"remained sensitive to the possibility of false charges instigated to
punish the father or to gain custody and support in divorce cases."'
10 4
Courts also have begun to carefully examine the child's story when it
appears the family may be closing "ranks to insulate the father from
charges."' 
0 5
97. Id. at 179-80. She states, "where once [the incest story] expressed a need to protect
the patriarch's property rights, it now identifies the patriarch as a monster." Id.
98. Id. at 180. Berry notes that though the notion of children as property has subsided,
the patriarchy is still alive and well in the notion that there now exist "defenses based on the
need to avoid interference with a man's responsibility for control of his wife and children..."
Id. at 191.
99. BERRY, supra note 1, at 180. This is a Freudian notion, which puts some of the
blame for incest on the child, and denies the reality of reports of incest as "false memories" or
"fantasies." Id. at 179-80 (citing Sigmund Freud, Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria,
P.Rieff, ed. (NY, Cromwell-Collier, 1967)). Says Berry, because this bias exists against the
incest victim, a man was more likely to receive punishment for child rape than for incest.
Furthermore, when the victim was an African American "the theme of racial promiscuousness
embellished the defendant's tale of enticement."
100. Id. at 196-97. The idea was that the family needed help healing, rather than
punishing the perpetrator.
101. Id. at 197.
102. Id. at 199.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. And yet, despite these changes, though reporting has increased, the instance of
conviction remains low. Berry describes the court's confusion as: "[a] confused panoply of
aims and feelings-desire to maintain the nuclear family as a whole; adherence to the mythical
good family; awareness of male sexual aggression; and mother's unwillingness to
2001]
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H. The Pig Farmer's Daughter-Rape, Rumors of Rape, and White
Male Privilege
Rape cases, says Berry, "teach us that race, class, and gender are
not simple or straightforward entities or characteristics ... ." 106 Berry
states that every rape case required courts to manipulate the legal
evidence of rape stories that permeate society. 10 7 Berry highlights the
following rape stories:
1) rape convictions required proof of penetration achieved by force or
violence, to demonstrate the lack of consent;'
0 8
2) the woman should "look like" a rape victim, meaning she ought to
appear vulnerable and in need of the court's protection;1
0 9
3) African American women were always seen as "loose" women
with no right to refuse sex-so much so, that the rape of an African
American woman by a black or white man was for a time in some
states a non-indictable offense;"
0
acknowledge incest." Id. at 201. Their decisions, she says, reflect "the flux in gender and
power relationships" currently at work in "public discourse on the subject." Id.
106. Id. at 202.
107. Id. at 202-03 (explaining the notion that "patriarchy colored judges' visions when
they saw poor white women's charges of rape .... [but] race could easily efface class, so that
white judges and juries seeing African Americans on the stand saw not the class respectability
[they] had struggled to acquire but lustful black animals capable of violent rape or licentious
and sexually available black women." Id. What you can see, she says, "overarching all else is
that the law preserves class privilege, which usually means white male privilege." Id. at 203.
108. Id. at 235 (citing Rice v. State, 9 Md.App. 552 (1970)). For example, evidence of
injury or witnesses hearing the woman's screams in protest might make it more likely the man
was convicted. Berry also notes that following Susan Brownmiller's publication of her work,
Against Our Will, in which the notion of rape was exposed as a crime of violence rather than a
crime of sex, prosecutors joined women's groups in pushing for a change in laws which
undermined the need to show that the woman physically resisted her attacker to show non-
consent. BERRY, supra note 1, at 236 (citing AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE,
(NY, Random House, 1981)).
109. BERRY, supra note 1, at 233-35 (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 414 I11. 205, 111
N.E.2d 631 (1968)). See also, e.g., People v. Bakutis, 377 111. 205, 36 N.E.2d (1941) & Iowa v.
Pilcher, 171 N.W.2d 251 (1969). For example, women who had been out drinking or simply
out late in the evening were seen as "out looking for a good time and not 'averse to meeting
someone interested in the field of sex."' BERRY, supra note 1, at 234-35. Women who refuse
to follow this narrative "were deemed too forward," and were offered less protection by the
courts. Id. at 211.
110. BERRY, supra note 1, at 28 (citing George, a Slave v. State, 37 Miss. 306 (1859)). It
also may reflect the women as property notion that affects white and black women.
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4) "judges remain reluctant to exact severe punishment when white
women claim rape by" dates, ex-husbands, or ex-lovers;I
11
5) African American men who were convicted of raping white
women were sentenced to prison terms three to five times longer
than those convicted of other kinds of rape 112 and were almost
always the only ones to be given the death penalty for rape
convictions. 1 3
III. ANALYSIS
Berry begins her book with an illustration of her own
experience with the law as a small child in Nashville." 14  Here, she
111. BERRY, supra note 1, at 218. The judges remained suspicious that it was the woman
who wanted sex. The man simply became aroused by her seduction-arousal which "had to
be satiated." Id.
112. Berry contrasts the case of a black man's conviction of raping a fourteen-year-old
white girl with a white man's rape of an eleven-year-old white girl. Though she says both
cases were equally "disgusting," because of the jury's racially-motivated fears of the wild,
bestial, black man, Junior William's death penalty conviction was upheld, whereas William
Nillson received a twenty-year sentence. The barest of facts are given to support this
conclusion; however, given the magnitude of the difference between the death penalty
sentencing of black men as opposed to white men, Berry's notion has some support.
However, Berry does not comment on this, but it is worth noting that these cases occurred 13
years apart. Therefore, it is hard to say whether or not other factors may have influenced the
judges' sentencing in these cases. Id. at 189-90 (citing Williams v. State, 164 Tex.Crim. 347
(1956) & Nillson v. State, 477 S.W. 592 (1972)). Berry notes that William's victim was
choked into insensibility, spending 10 days in the hospital. Nillson's victim was left bloodied
and semiconscious.
113. BERRY, supra note 1, at 227, 238 (citing Jacquelyn Hall, The Mind that Burns in
Each Body: Women, Rape, and Racial Violence 328-49, Ann Snitow, et al. eds. POWERS OF
DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY (NY Monthly Review Press, 1983)). Berry also notes the
disparate treatment of African American males when charged and convicted of raping a white
women or girl. In fact, though an available punishment in many states for statutory rape, only
black men's death penalty convictions have been upheld by the courts. Of 455 men executed
for rape between 1930 and 1968, 405 or 89 percent were black. See also Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (finding the death penalty, as practiced in Florida, Georgia, and Texas
unconstitutional because of disparate treatment by race); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (finding an Eighth Amendment violation in using the death penalty for adult rape
charges unless severe bodily harm occurred); see also BERRY, supra note 1, at 227-28, 237.
Berry also observed that the death penalty was reinstated in 1976 under certain procedural
safeguards. Several states reenacted their death penalty statutes, but only Florida, Mississippi,
and Tennessee continue to have death available as a punishment for child rape by an adult
rapist. Berry attributes this solely to those states having strong continued patriarchal stories.
She says, in those states, "the law must sternly punish the invasion of a man's property in his




remembers being harassed by police officers on motorcycles who
would chase local African American children who were innocently
playing in the street. 115 She says of her experience, "[m]ost Euro-
Americans have not experienced motorcycle policemen trying to run
them over .... White Americans have their own stories, but these do
not include African American's profoundly racist and discriminatory
experiences with the law." 116  Says Berry, the police are white
persons' guardians. 1 17 "[White persons] stories presume a system of
evenhanded justice and equality before the law.""1 8 Because this is a
true statement one must ask whether a white reviewer can truly
understand the race-related argument made here. The answer is-
probably not. This is why the reader of this review needs to stay
vigilant to the lens with which this reviewer sees her subject. 19
Berry's work is exceptional and highly provocative. Her
thesis, that white-male privilege defines almost (if not every) decision
made in society and in the courts, is very bold and probably true. This
review will first examine these criticisms, then turn to the more
praiseworthy aspects of The Pig Farmer.
A. Criticisms
1. What About the Law?
Berry has a law degree, but she is not a practicing lawyer.
120
As such, she might not see case studies through the same lens as a
practicing lawyer. She might not appreciate the subtle differences in
civil procedure and evidence law that might change what evidence a
jury hears. To a historian, the judge's exclusion of some essential fact
might seem like bias. To a trial lawyer, excluding the evidence might
115. Id.
116. Id. at 5.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 5-6.
119. This reviewer's lens is that of white woman who grew up in small town in
Massachusetts (later moving to Florida, but whose core values are that of a privileged white
"Yankee"). Barbara Flagg notes her belief that "whiteness is a transparent quality." This
"whiteness" may make some who are unaccustomed to other than non-whiteness unable to
view that "other's" existence with the same vision. Barbara Flagg, Was Blind, But Now I See:
White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, in POWER,
PRIVILEGE, AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 34 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman, eds.,
1995).
120. Professor Berry is a history professor at University of Pennsylvania.
<http://www.history.edu/faculty/berry.html>. See also supra note 6.
MARGINS
BOOK REVIEW
seem more like the judge had concerns about prejudicing the jury.
Consider the case of the pig farmer's daughter.
Berry tells the story of Annie Knuppel, a fifteen-year-old,
German immigrant living in Texas in 1886 who was a pig farmer's
daughter. 12 1 Annie was returning home from the doctor one day when
she was approached from behind and raped. 122  Annie identified a
well-known black man, Albert Johnson, as the perpetrator. 23 Berry
notes that though this allegation came at a time when the black vote
was being suppressed by violence and other means, giving blacks very
little political power, Johnson was not lynched. 124 She notes that at his
trial, six witnesses (both black and white) testified to Johnson's
character for veracity. She says these witnesses "include[ed] the
sheriff, the county attorney, and the judge and ex-judge of the county
court." 125 Further, she notes that in two separate trials, Johnson was
convicted. 126 On two separate instances, the appeals court overturned
the convictions.' 27 Berry says the prosecutor decided not to pursue the
matter a third time.'
28
Berry points out that the judges were Confederates who had
fought in the Civil War for the South. 129  Despite their potential
prejudices against Johnson, Berry notes that their decision can be
explained. These judges, she says, found not for Johnson, but for the
well-to-do white patrons who had testified on his behalf.130  Berry
observes that in an earlier case involving a black man, the same judges
noted that the defendant was "always a humble, respectful Negro,
never disposed to fudge on the rights of the white people."'131 Berry
states that the "[l]ocal juries and prosecutors, polarized by race, valued
even a poor immigrant white woman's words against a black man-
121. BERRY, supra note 1, at 205-08 (citing Johnson v. State, 27 Tex.App. 163 (1889).
See also Johnson v. State, 21 Tex.App. 268 (1888). Berry implies, but does not say, that being
a pig farmer's daughter in Texas in the 1880s was a fairly low-status class position.
122. BERRY, supra note 1, at 205.
123. Id. at 206.
124. Id. Lynching was a popular pastime for southern whites at this time. Berry notes
that one study reported that between 1880 and 1897 64 persons were lynched. Fifty-one were
black men. Twenty-six were for alleged rapes. Lynching often if not always took place
without a trial or hearing on the matter. Id. at 203-05.
125. Id. at 206.
126. Id. at 206-07.
127. Id. at 207.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 208.
131. Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 18 Tex.App. 485 (1885)).
2001]
[VOL. 1:169
but not elite appellate judges, who had competing concerns."' She
says "for them, class was the telling issue. 133  Among conflicting
stories, they chose to affirm white male privilege and paternalism in
race relations."'
' 34
While this may have been an accurate depiction of the
mentality of the appellate court, Berry's reasoning is flawed. She says,
"[the judges] acknowledged that a rape case arouses public indignation
and fires the minds and passions of a community with a desire for
vengeance"; therefore, "counsel engaged in the trial should be
scrupulously cautious to accord the defendants a fair and impartial
trial, as free as possible from excitement and prejudice."' 135 According
to Berry, this fear of prejudice is not why the judges found as they did,
but rather that the men who testified for Johnson were prominent white
men in the community. 136 She says this, but cites no reason other than
her belief that the judges were following the "good Negro"
narrative. 137 The judges' comments sound like a fair assessment of the
prejudice that likely would happen if a jury heard that there might have
been a confession, especially given the all-white jury's existing
potential prejudice toward the black defendant. One could have seen
the case as impressive because the judges were interested in assuring
impartiality and fairness for the African American defendant, but this
criticism perhaps is seen through the lens of white privilege.
Another example of this potential indifference to the law
underpinning the case is found in the property distribution cases in
Chapter Three. Berry explains that the only reason judges tended to
award African American women and children the inheritances given to
them by white men via their wills was because these judges were
upholding the white man's privilege to distribute his property.
138
While this might be true, it is also possible that the judges were merely
upholding the law, which makes the intent of the testator the higher
132. BERRY, supra note I, at 208.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 207 (quoting Johnson v. State, 27 Tex.App. 163 (1889) (noting that
prosecutors over objection by the defense had several times asked Johnson questions about a
letter of confession he allegedly had written. No such letter was ever produced at trial. The
appellate judges properly felt these questions had unduly prejudiced the jury.).
136. BERRY, supra note 1, at 207.
137. Id.
138. BERRY, supra note 1, at 102-103.
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arbiter of a will's conveyances. 139 Through Berry's lens, which was
justifiably focused on injustice, no matter which way the judges
decided, they would always be upholding white male privilege.
2. Judges Could Never Win
In many instances in the book, Berry notes that the judge who
decided a case in a way which benefited the minority member did so,
not in the interest of fairness or justice, but solely because the judge
was feeling paternally toward the downtrodden soul. 141 In all
instances in the book, Berry notes that if a judge decided a case in a
way that did not benefit the minority member, he did so because he
was ascribing to prejudicial narratives about the minority group. 141
Whichever way a judge decided, he was ascribing to the narrative of
white-male privilege. This kind of argument is flawed because it is
circular and leaves no room for alternatives.
One alternative is that the judge might have decided the case
on its merits. Sometimes humans labeled as minority group members
are guilty of the crimes committed and deserve the punishment they
receive. Another alternative is that the judge was trying to right
society's wrong by finding in a "paternalistic" way. Rape victims
ought to have their crimes vindicated. Children born in poor families
who are abused ought to be protected. A third alternative is that the
judge made an error based on some other aspect of the case. For
example, the Turner case discussed earlier exemplifies this point. 42
The appellate court overturned the lower court's decision to
deny Mrs. Turner's divorce. 143  Though the narratives that Berry
discusses were probably at work, it could also be true that the appellate
court felt that granting Mrs. Turner's divorce was the legally proper
thing to do given the facts of the case. This was a woman who had
139. "In construing wills, a majority of jurisdictions follow (or purport to follow) the
plain meaning rule: a 'plain meaning' in a will cannot be distributed by the introduction of
extrinsic evidence that another meaning was intended." JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M.
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 409-410 (6th ed., Aspen Law & Business 2000).
140. See, e.g., the pig farmer's daughter case, BERRY, supra note 1, at 207-08; discussion
supra at Part II-H; Turner v. Turner, BERRY, supra note 1, at 3-4; discussion infra at Part III-
A-2; and the discussion supra at Part 11-D on prostitution (perhaps the men disagreed with the
law because they did not feel that society ought to punish crimes that are merely "moral"
wrongs).
141. The decisions found racial, gender, or class discrimination or, if the defendant was
not found responsible, then paternalistic notions were at work.




been severely emotionally and physically abused. To deny her divorce
petition would have been unthinkable, even in her era.144
In the case of the pig farmer's daughter, Berry has her reader
emotionally convinced that the judges found against Annie because
she was a less valued member of society and Mr. Johnson was a
portrayed as "good Negro." Yet, intellectually we are left wondering
about alternatives for her theory. Perhaps, southern judges did not
much like the notion of foreigners moving in on their crop or pig
business, taking jobs away from "real" Americans. Or maybe the
judges felt Annie was not convincing as a witness. Perhaps Mr.
Johnson was an upstanding citizen with an impeccable record for
honesty, which the judges could not ignore. According to Berry, the
judges were paternalistic because they found for Johnson. However, it
is also possible Berry would have labeled the judges racist had they
found against Johnson.
3. Townsfolk Cannot Win Either
According to Berry, if the actions of a few idiots "outrage"
others, the "outraged" ones really are not "outraged," but are covering
up for their town or worried about the image of their town.1 45 For
example, Berry uses the following case to show how immigrant men
from northern cities may have tried to raise themselves up above the
status of blacks by "becoming white" and then persecuting blacks,
sometimes by lynching. 146  Berry retells the story of a particularly
troubling case, which occurred in Duluth, Minnesota-a northern city
then with 98,000 whites and 485 African Americans. 147 Here, six or
seven black men allegedly raped a young woman.14 8 A riot ensued in
which a crowd broke into the jail and held a "kangaroo court" where
three of the men were declared guilty and sentenced to lynching.
149
144. Id. Mr. Turner sent his mistress out to get a switch which he planned to use on his
wife. He made his wife "stand on the floor before him and his paramour, the colored woman
Sally, and cower under the switches." He had a history of wife battering. Mrs. Turner filed for
divorce under the grounds of cruelty, abandonment, and adultery.
145. Id. at 221.
146. Id. at 219.
147. Id. at 219-22. This is one of the few northern cases which Berry uses to illustrate
her thesis. See discussion infra at Part III-A-3.




The men found guilty were taken out and immediately hanged before
the onlookers.' 
50
Following the execution, Berry tells us that those townsfolk
"worried about the image of their town ... blasted the lynching." The
Rotarians and Kiwanis clubs "call[ed] the lynchings a shocking
outrage."' 5' Furthermore, Berry notes that Judge Cant Jr. told grand
jurors that the lynchings were an "atrocious" example in "open
defiance of the law." 152 While the judge's subconscious intent may or
may not have been as Berry believes, this kind of argument is
impossible to reconcile. Either way the judge and the rest of the
townsfolk reacted, they are assumed to be acting out of white
privilege. If the townsfolk agreed with the lynchers, they are labeled
racists, if they do not agree and protest, they are only doing so because
the laborers were "not fully white" and therefore they are still
racists. 153
Berry also notes that several groups with African American
members expressed their "sadness" with the events. They expressed
"no animosity and were thankful for the resolutions of the Kiwanis and
other groups."'' 54  According to Berry, the African American group
probably expressed these kinds of comments because they were afraid
to speak out. 155 The rapists were eventually tried in a court of law and
found guilty; the lynchers were tried in eight separate trials and none
was ever imprisoned. 156 Berry writes, "public sympathy[] lay not with
the elites' efforts to withhold the cloak of whiteness but with the
perpetrators."' 57 Through another lens, one can see alternative stories.
The townsfolk might have been genuinely outraged by the
conduct of their neighbors. The people might actually have been
150. Id. at 221.
151. Id. at221.
152. Id.
153. Id. Berry states, the "city's elite [who had denounced the lynching of three men
accused but not yet tried for rape] sought to distance itself by arguing that the immigrant
laborers involved the lynchings were still not fully white, not possessed of white male
privilege."
154. Id. at221-22.
155. Id. at 221 (citing articles from the DuLuTH NEWS TRiBUNE, including Duluth Has
Suffered a Disgrace, a Horrible Blot Upon Its Name that It Can Never Outlive (editorial), June
17, 1920; Police Warned of Lynch Plot in Advance, June 18, 1920; Lynchers Flayed in Charge
of Grand Jury, June 18, 1920; and Roundup of Lynchers Starts Today, June 17, 1920).
156. BERRY, supra note 1, at 222. Berry discusses at some length the trial of the alleged
rapists, but does not discuss the trials of the lynchers. This may be a mistake, because it seems
that this could be the more troubling result of this case.
157. Id. at 222-24.
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concerned for the men who were killed. Alternatively, the people
might have cared little for these men, but were concerned about the
lack of due process, and the possibilities that the lack of due process
might have meant for them and their rights. The people might have
had a similar bias as the Texas appellate court against foreigners. The
men who lynched these poor souls were also immigrants.
4. Southern State Justice
Berry used the southern reporters to find cases for her early
analysis of post Civil War America.1 58  Regardless of the numbers
present, not including northern cases in her analysis of post Civil War
America could be an error. While it is true that more African
Americans were in the South, the problem with leaving the North out
of the analysis is that it leaves room for those skeptics who would say
these narratives did not exist in the North. Without the analysis, one
cannot know for certain.
The South was a much different place from the North
following the Civil War. Studying the South after the war and calling
it "America" is like studying North Vietnam after its break from South
Vietnam, and still calling it Vietnam. One cannot let the values of the
vanquished part of a nation stand for the nation's values as a whole.
The southern states had (some still have) federalist leanings. They
believed that state's rights should be protected, and as such might have
been less likely to follow the federal laws. Furthermore, the southern
states most likely resented being told they could no longer hold their
slaves as they wished. This resentment probably spilled into their
decisions regarding African American defendants. This resentment
might not have been present in the North, resulting in different
decisions.
Berry does not mention abolitionist groups from the North and
South who fought to bring an end to slavery and worked for the
inclusion of African Americans into mainstream society. Berry also
does not mention the millions of Americans from the North who
158. BERRY, supra note 1, at 244. Berry relates here research methods in a
Methodological Note. She states that since most African Americans live in the South until the
1900s, the cases she studies in this book were collected by reading the southern state reporters
and West Century Digest. More recent cases are gleaned from throughout the nation in
Decennial Digests and Westlaw. Berry used a "random number generator," and a sample of
10 percent of the cases were picked. She says, "race and gender were almost always
identifiable from the court opinions." She also checked her sources against Census records,
National Archives, local police and court records, and newspapers.
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fought and died to bring an end to slavery. 159 There is no mention of a
president who felt so strongly that people should not be enslaved that
he sent his country to war over it. Some of these abolitionists and
soldiers and presidents were lawyers, judges, or politicians. Surely,
these men and women (black and white) believed in and fought for
narratives different from the ones told by Berry. The narratives they
believed may have been northern narratives. Are these not
"American" narratives as well? One might imagine that they are, but
inclusion of them might have undermined Berry's thesis. We do not
know because they were not considered here.
One of the biggest repositories of white-male privilege in
modem America is the United States Supreme Court. Despite this,
Berry spends very little time looking at its decisions. From 1865 to the
present, seventy-five justices have sat on the Court. Of those only
between eighteen and twenty-five percent 60 were from the South.
Until 1954, when Brown v. Board of Education'6' was decided, the
Supreme Court has been less than helpful to the plight of African
Americans in this country.' 62 By examining some of the cases decided
by the Court around the same time, instead of looking only to southern
reporters, perhaps Berry could better determine whether the northern
judicial mentality at that time was the same or different from that of
the southern one.
Berry mentions that she gleaned her more recent cases from
Decennial Digests and Westlaw. An informal survey of the cases cited
in the book revealed that very few are from the North. Though Berry
probably is making a distinction between the North and South as they
sided in the Civil War, the few cases that are from the "North" are
159. Though there were other political reasons for the war, the abolition of slavery was
its chief purpose.
160. The percentage depends on whether one looks at the place of their birth or the place
at which they lived and worked when chosen to serve on the Court. For example, two
"southern" justices were born in the South, but moved to northern states because they opposed
slavery. One justice, Miller, freed his slaves before moving. The Oyez Project Northwestern
University (visited October 27, 2000), <http://www.oyez.nwu.edu/justices>.
161. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
162. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (striking the Civil Rights Act of
1875 because it applied solely to private conduct, which went beyond the scope of Congress'
power to enforce under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding a state law which mandated that railroads maintain separate cars
for black and white riders). Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How) 393 (1957) (holding that




from the mid-west (e.g., Minnesota or Illinois), and not from the
Northeast. For example, the Duluth lynching case illustrates a
"northern" case. 163  However, even there the outraged townspeople
and local media denounced the crimes. There was not a public
acceptance of the lynching. 164 Because there was no acceptance of
the lynchings and because there were so few examples of northern
cases, one could surmise that the result in Duluth was an anomalous
one and the North was different from the South. However, it is
difficult to discern given the paucity of decisions from northern judges
or juries included in the book.
5. Criticism Conclusions
Because those of us who study the law of equality might
already have a bias in favor of minority issues and against the
dastardly "white male," it is easy to know that Berry is right about her
"stories" and their effect on judges' decision making. However, not
all readers would be so convinced. Berry's anecdotal report of cases
takes place without consideration of the alternatives for her
conclusions and presupposes that her story is the one that the judge
believed. This works much better when reporting about older cases,
where judges' biases were much more apparent and often explicitly
stated. Perhaps this is why Berry reports so few newer cases.
Though Professor Berry has a law degree, she is a sociologist
and a historian. From a historical and sociological perspective, one
could be convinced that white males rule American culture because
sociologists and historians deal in numbers and trends. The numbers
and trends in the cases Berry uses lean very heavily toward her thesis.
This is why on a gut level one must believe her. Yet, from a legal
perspective, one can find holes in her analysis because so many of the
facts are not before us. We are asked as readers to make judgments
about cases where only the barest of facts are given. As lawyers,
where the entire record is not before us, we are trained to reserve
judgment. When one questions the motives of the justice system, one
can presume fairness and work inward or presume injustice and work
outward. Perhaps, the ultimate answer lies in Berry's description of
her and other African Americans' experiences with the law. Hers is
the lens of an African American female who through experience has




learned to distrust the law. Through that lens, one can easily see the
truth of her writing. Through other lenses, one can not be sure.
B. High Praise
Despite my few criticisms, this is a very important work. It
points out a particularly troubling side of society, and correctly holds
that the cultural belief systems (stories) can greatly affect judges'
decisions. The reader is left with only a little doubt that a significant
portion of society, as reflected by the courts, is controlled by the white
male privilege. The notion that white male privilege dominates is very
topical, especially given the current sociological and legal discussion
about this subject.' 5 Berry makes her arguments plausibly. The case
studies often make the reader angry or sad. The hopeful note for
change that concluded almost every chapter gives one hope that all is
not lost.
1. Reform Movement
Berry notes that the social reform movements that took place in
the aftermath of the Duluth lynching displaced many of the old
stories. 166 The widespread practice of lynching has stopped, albeit
much too late for Claude Neal and Cleo Wright. 167 Berry observes
that the courts have began to emphasize the need to ensure due process
and equality in court proceedings. 168  Berry gives credit to reform
groups like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) and women's groups who worked to make these
changes.' 69 She cautions, however, that the old stories die hard, and
165. See, e.g., Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account
of Coming to See Correspondences through Work in Women's Studies, in POWER, PRIVILEGE,
AND THE LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22, 22-33 (Leslie Bender & Daan Bravemen eds.,
1995).
166. BERRY, supra note 1, at 224-25 (noting that "[dlue process stories and racial equality
stories, and women's autonomy and equality stories, partially broke down the gender and
racial subornation stories on which patriarchy depended").
167. Id. at 225-27. Berry tells the story of these men who were brutally tortured and
lynched in the 1930s and 40s with no process whatsoever for allegedly raping or murdering
white women. See, e.g., James McGovern, Anatomy of a Lynching: The Killing of Claude
Neal, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1982) and see also Domenic Capeci,
The Lynching of Cleo Wright: Federal Protection of Constitutional Rights During World War
II, 859, JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 72 (March 1986).
168. BERRY, supra note 1, at 237-38.
169. Id. at 237.
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noted several more recent cases in which the white male power
narrative had reared its ugly head. 170 Berry is particularly concerned
about the light sentencing she observed despite very brutal rapes and
the stacking of juries by peremptory challenges striking blacks and
women. 171
2. Current Affairs
Berry also makes bold statements about recent cases that have
become current affairs.. For example, she discusses the Clarence
Thomas-Anita Hill saga, and the O.J. Simpson trial. Berry notes "that
the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas saga was not about two African
Americans."' 72  Rather, because powerful white politicians saw
Clarence Thomas as the "white man's boy," it was "about the white
male privilege to devalue her, and to elevate him, as surely as the
rapist of the pig farmer's daughter ... ." 173 Berry believes the only
difference is "that the stakes were higher. . .. ,174 Berry's argument is
very persuasive, but again there are alternatives to her story.
President Bush wanted a conservative justice on the bench.
Considering Thurgood Marshall's retirement would leave the Court
without a minority justice, President Bush, concerned with "political
correctness," sought a minority replacement. Thus, the Congress and
the President were under pressure to approve Clarence Thomas
because he was both conservative and a minority member. This might
also have contributed to their appointment of him despite some pretty
good evidence that he had in fact sexually harassed Anita Hill. This
theory is not offered to completely discount Berry's theory. Both are
probably true.
. In the trial of O.J. Simpson, Berry says the all-female, mostly
black jury's decision is further evidence of the effects of one's
experiences on the decisions one makes as a juror. 175  Says Berry,
"[t]he . . . trial exemplifies the ways in which different racial
experiences with the law produce conflicting stories about the law."'
176
170. Id. at 238-41.
171. Id. at 239-41 (noting that until Batson v. Kentucky, 426 U.S. 79 (1986) and J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994) there was no prohibition against peremptory
challenges based on race or sex).
172. BERRY, supra note 1, at 242.
173. Id. at 242-43.
174. Id. at 242-43.
175. Id. at 6-8.
176. Id. at 6.
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This story is also good evidence regarding how one's vision of the
world affects one's reaction to it. Berry notes that this jury had a
distrust of police. 177 Like Berry, they grew up with a view of police as
harassers, not helpers. Observes Berry, the defense team was also
aware of this. They were able to play to the jury's experiences,
whereas Christopher Darden could not.178 Mr. Darden was upholding
and extolling the white man's law. It did not matter to the jury that he
was African American. Berry says, "even without the Fuhrman tapes,
race would have been in the room, as it is whenever blacks encounter
the legal system."'
179
Berry makes another interesting observation in noting that the
split in the country's reaction to the jury's decision ran along racial
lines. She says this reaction is explainable by noting that the white
population's reaction was a product of their surprise that "the minority
African American narrative of injustice prevailed." The notion of
injustice is a "novel and to many Euro-Americans, shocking, enraging
experience."' 8 0  In my opinion, this is an extremely important point
because it turns the whiteness vs. otherness scenario on its head. That
is, for one moment in time, Euro-Americans were on the outside
looking into the African American experience. 18' Perhaps, that is why
it intrigued the country so intensely for so long.
3. Hope For Change
Berry says white males who have become non-racist and non-
sexist along with those in the social movement need to work to change
the white male stories in order to secure that "every adult has the
traditional heterosexual white male freedom to make sexual
choices."' 82 Again, it is easy to agree with Berry, but also one must
think that it is not only the white man who must change his stories
about himself. We all must change our perception of ourselves in
177. Id at 7 (citing Christopher A. Darden with Jess Walter, IN CONTEMPT 168-69 (Harper
Collins 1996)). Christopher Darden described the jury pool as "a nightmare," a "stagnant,
shallow pool of bitterness and anger .... The system itself had forged this jury .... In the
molten anger of a million indignities and injustices, some collective and historical, some
deeply personal."
178. BERRY, supra note 1, at 8 (noting the failure of the prosecution to convince the jury
that the gloves fit or to overcome the problematic blood evidence).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See discussion supra, at note 119.
182. BERRY, supra note 1, at 243.
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relation to the majority stories. For example, the white woman who is
raped must, despite strong pressure to stay quiet, scream aloud her
indignation at being assaulted.
A recent case in which two men raped a young college woman
is illustrative of this viewpoint. 183 Christy Brzonkala was brutally
raped by two men. 184 After the rape, she waited months to tell her
story, and then she told a friend who encouraged her to go to the
authorities.'8 5 Christy went to school officials at the college both she
and her attackers attended. 186  The college had a policy stating that
when a rape was reported the school did not immediately call the
police, as it did for every other type of crime that happened on its
campus. 187 No school officials or counselors encouraged Christy to go
to the police, but instead the school prosecuted the "crime" as an
administrative matter.' 8 8 One of the offenders was acquitted for lack
of evidence, and the other got a one-hour counseling session and a
deferred suspension from school. 189  After the incident, Christy quit
school, became clinically depressed, and attempted suicide. 19° While
it is very easy and justifiable to be angry with the attackers and the
school for their mishandling of Christy's case, one must also put some
responsibility on Christy. She is the mistress of her domain, and must
assert her own rights. Christy most likely worried about the reaction of
her friends, school, family, and society when she failed to report the
rape to the police immediately after it happened. However, if we
allow ourselves to feel subordinate, helpless, and deflowered, we most
likely will become that.
Christy, like many women, devalued herself when she did not
immediately come forward with her rape. Women must themselves
183. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., et. at (Brzonkala 1), 935 F.Supp.
772 (W.D.Va. 1996).





189. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., et. al.(Bronkala II), 132 F.3d 949,
955 (4th Cir. 1997), affid 529 U.S. 598, U.S. v. Morrison (2000). He did not confess to the
rape, while the other perpetrator did confess. The offender who was punished was a star
football player. Id. at 960. Both defendants were African American and Christy was white.
One could argue that this story resembles the pig farmer's daughter case in that the player,
though black and accused of raping a white girl, was acquitted because he was useful to
another one of the great white institutions in this country, the university, and its highly valued
icon, football.
190. Brzonkala I, 935 F.Supp. at 774.
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break free of that mold. White men are not going to break the mold
for them. I cannot speak for African Americans, gays, or lesbians.
Others must look through those lenses, but perhaps they too could see
the strength in their own personal ability to shake free of the white
male privilege. What is done by oneself can be most empowering.
Unlike the past in which all-white male judges and juries
decided cases, women and minorities are now able to participate in the
judicial process. This will hopeflilly change the landscape of the
American justice system in a positive way. All judges should have to
read Berry's book as a prerequisite to sitting on the bench. If nothing
else, it would make them think about their decisions and their own
experiences as they get expressed in the "stories" about which Berry
has written. Berry says that changing the law means changing the
white male's stories about himself and others.191 She says, "the stories
must be changed, if we want a law to presume that every adult has the
traditional heterosexual white male freedom to make sexual
choices."' 192 Hopefully, we will make more strides in that direction in
the near future.
However, one recent development leads me to believe that at
least in some sense we have not changed at all. A recent article in The
Nation noted that in an effort to stave off any potential anti-
pornography regulations from the George W. Bush administration,
"some of the major porn outfits have reached a common conclusion
and issued sweeping guidelines to producers and directors" of
pornographic films. 19 Among guidelines such as no blindfolds and no
wax dripping, is a guideline that forbids any black men, white women
themes." However, the guidelines state that "producers can continue to
feature white men having sex with black women."'194 It seems the
view of black women as being lascivious wenches who are at the
service of white men has changed little. Nor has the notion that a
black man having sex with a white woman is rape and is somehow
worse than other sexual relations of human beings. White women are
still seen, at least by some, as naYve beings who must be protected
from the wild, bestial, black male. Comer calls these guidelines an
191. BERRY, supra note 1, at 243.
192. Id.





"era of kinder, gentler smut." 195 On the contrary, it is not kinder, and
reflects society's continuing deeply held misperception of all beings
save for white males.
195. Id.
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